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In this paper we compare two policy instruments that can be adopted to curb
carbon emissions. The first is a conventional pollution tax, the second is an en-
vironmental campaign raising consumers’ awareness about the relative impact of
their consumption choices. The comparison is carried out in two different scenar-
ios, depending on whether consumers’ aprioristic preferences are such that they
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1 Introduction
The theme of environmental protection is one of the most important priorities on the
agenda for policymakers and governments across the globe. In particular, the discussion
has focused on which policy instrument should be adopted to induce firms to reduce the
level of pollution emissions. The conventional instrument, a tax proportional to the level
of pollution, has been often criticized, on the grounds that it is very difficult to measure
the exact damage produced by each firm. Likewise, other alternative tools have been
proposed and policies have been suggested.
Many commentators argue that educating citizens/consumers to respect the environ-
ment may prove to be a very effective instrument, as it rewards green producers to the
detriment of brown ones. Turaga et al. (2010) claim that “inducing pro-environmental
behaviors in individuals, is one of the most important challenges in the path to sus-
tainability” (p. 211). However, shaping an environmental culture requires a long-term
investment, as it involves teaching environmental values at school, organizing outdoor ini-
tiatives that instill respect for nature, providing infrastructures and services in support of
renewable energy and recycling. A short-term alternative often adopted by governments
is to introduce environmental awareness campaigns.1 Indeed, there is recent evidence of
public authorities launching campaigns to warn citizens about the harmful effects of bad
consumption habits on the environment. This is particularly common in the automotive
sector. The Italian guidelines on CO2 emission savings ranks vehicles according to their
environmental impact.2 In the US, the EPA Smart Way program compares environ-
mental performance of vehicles.3 The Green Vehicle Guide promoted by the Australian
government helps drivers by rating circulating vehicles on the basis of greenhouse and air
pollution emissions.4
1Empirical evidence shows a significant result of such campaigns in the short-run. However, their effect
reduces in the long-run. An example is provided by Allcott and Rogers (2014) on social comparison-based
home energy reports.
2Visit www.mit.gov.it/mit/site.php?p=cm&o=vd&id=2724 for further details.
3Visit www.epa.gov/smartway/basic-info/index.htm for further details.
4The rating is calculated using data provided by manufacturers from specific tests following the
Australian standards. Visit http://www.greenvehicleguide.gov.au/GVGPublicUI/home.aspx for further
information.
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How do consumers react to such initiatives? Are they really willing to switch to a
green good, even if the pure satisfaction deriving from its consumption is lower than
that of a brown good? Electric vehicles (EVs), for example, have yet to reach a level of
performance and comfort comparable to that of traditional internal combustion engine
vehicles (ICEVs).5 Depending on whether consumers value the pure performance of
the product more (or less!) than its environmental impact, the same policy tool may
differently affect consumers’ choice. This is what we want to capture in our paper. To
this aim, we compare traditional policy instruments such as imposing taxes on polluting
firms with recently established initiatives such as environmental awareness campaigns that
inform consumers about the relative environmental impact of the goods they purchase.
We adopt a model of vertical differentiation where two firms compete in prices. As
usual, they differentiate their products by quality as a way to mitigate competition and
increase profits (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1982). In particular,
one of the two firms produces the green good and pays an additional cost for it, while the
other firm produces a polluting good, and may be subject to environmental taxation.
Based on our preliminary discussion, we consider two different scenarios, depending
on whether consumers’ aprioristic preferences are such that they either value the environ-
mental quality of the goods (their polluting emissions) or their hedonic quality (their pure
performance).6 In the first case, following most of the literature (e.g., Moraga-Gonzales
and Padron-Fumero, 2002; Lombardini-Riipinen, 2005; Deltas et al., 2013; Ben Elhadj
and Tarola, 2015), we assume that the green good is of high quality and the polluting
brown good is of low quality. In the second case, based on the observation that quite of-
ten brown goods have higher performance than green alternatives (e.g., Weatherell et al.,
2003; Gupta and Ogden 2009; Mantovani et el., 2016), we assume that the high quality
good is the one that pollutes whereas the low quality good is green.
5Recent advances in technology have allowed electric car manufacturers to launch EVs which are com-
parable with ICEVs in terms of acceleration and speed. The Tesla S, for example, is a high-performance
electric sedan. However, drivers may be inconvenienced by the time spent to recharge the battery, as
well as the scarce availability of charging stations in many parts of the globe.
6In general, the term hedonic refers to the valuation of different attributes of a good, one of which
may be its environmental performance. However, this term has been increasingly used to define the pure
performance of a good and to differentiate it from its environmental attributes. See Lambertini (2013)
and Mantovani et al. (2016), inter alii.
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In each scenario, we build a two-stage game where the government intervenes in the
first stage by either taxing the polluting firm, or by indirectly rewarding the green firm
through an environmental campaign. In the second stage, firms compete in prices. A
crucial point of our model is that the campaign is designed to raise consumers’ awareness
about the impact of their consumption choices on the ecosystem in which they live.
In particular, by comparing the environmental impact of the two products, its aim is to
persuade consumers to attach an extra positive value to the green good while at the same
time stigmatizing the consumption of the brown one. This is captured by resorting to the
theory of relative preferences, initially developed by Ghazzai (2008) as well as Alexopoulos
and Sapp (2006), and recently reconsidered by Ben Elhadj and Tarola (2015).
Our main results are as follows. When consumers initially value the environmental
quality, so that they all agree that the green good has a higher quality than the brown
good, the awareness campaign can be socially more efficient than the pollution tax. This
happens when the cost of the campaign is not excessive, and when the green expansion
effect is sufficiently high. Such an effect is related to the increase in the demand of
the green good resulting from the campaign, achieved at the expense of the brown (low
quality) good, and proportional to the average willingness to pay for the environmental
quality.
On the contrary, when consumers initially value the hedonic quality of a product (that
may be at odds with their environmental quality), then taxation always prevails in terms
of social welfare. In such a scenario the campaign is relatively costly and limited in scope;
even though its message has been incorporated, consumers do not value the environmen-
tal component enough to outweigh their innate inclination towards the hedonic quality.
Nonetheless, the campaign may be preferred if the policymaker is particularly interested
in consumer surplus. Indeed, in the case of hedonic qualities, the green expansion effect
does not only consist of “stealing” market shares from the brown (high quality) producer,
but it also expands market coverage, thus increasing total output. This may contribute
to resolve the frequently observed conflict between environmental and competition policy,
as the campaign is capable of reconciling output provision with pollution reduction.
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The main message of our contribution can therefore be summarized as follows. Based
on total surplus as a measure of social welfare, an environmental campaign activating
relative preferences is less efficient than a traditional taxation instrument when consumers
are mainly interested in the pure performance of a product. The result may change
with green consumerism, in which case the campaign can achieve a higher total surplus
than taxation. Our analysis can thus provide valuable environmental policy indications,
depending on region-specific consumer preferences and socio-economic conditions.
Looking at the empirical evidence, aprioristic environmental preferences vary across
countries as well as over time due to socio-economic conditions. Bhate (2001) and Hop-
kins and Mehanna (2000), inter alii, show that consumers in developing countries are at
the early stage of green consumerism, thus ranking economic interests before environmen-
tal concerns. Greenstone and Jack (2015) point out that, although developing countries
face higher health burdens than developed countries due to poorer environmental condi-
tions, “the small handful of studies measuring marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for
environmental quality improvements indicate low valuations by affected households” (p.
7). One of the main explanations provided by the authors is due to low income. Hence,
in countries characterized by limited environmental concern (low MWTP for environ-
mental quality) an indirect policy instrument like a campaign is less likely to efficiently
fight pollution. As for developed countries, an European survey conducted between April
and May 2011 on citizens’ attitude towards the environment (Special Eurobarometer 365)
showed that most EU citizens feel that environmental issues have a direct impact on their
everyday lives and they are also inclined to play a proactive role in protecting the envi-
ronment.7 According to our model, in such countries the type of campaign that we have
in mind may perform better than the tax instrument from the social perspective. Case
in point, the recent informative campaigns in the automotive sector that we introduced
before have been launched in developed countries.
Our paper contributes to identify which policy tool is more efficient in reducing pol-
luting emissions in presence of environmentally concerned consumers. The papers by
7For more details, visit: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/pdf/EB summary EB752.pdf
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Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero (2002) and Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) represent
useful references. In the former, the authors compare some frequently used environmental
policies: emissions standard, ad valorem tax and technology subsidization. They demon-
strate that aggregate emissions may increase as a result of government regulation due
to the strategic responses of the firms to those regulations. In the latter, Lombardini-
Riipinen (2005) finds that the first-best level of quality can be obtained by combining a
uniform ad valorem tax with an emission tax (or a subsidy to consumers buying green
products). In a recent book, Lambertini (2013, Ch. 6) provides a careful discussion
about the possibility that environmentally aware consumers may regulate firm’s behavior
even in absence of an explicit policy measure. We complement this stream of research
by explicitly considering a policy intervention like the campaign which makes consumers
aware of the relative environmental impact of the products.
The idea of an environmental campaign as an alternative policy instrument has been
recently analyzed in other contributions. Sartzetakis et al. (2012) study in a dynamic
framework the role of information provision on environmental damages associated to the
consumption of certain products as a policy instrument that supplements environmental
taxation. In their model, the campaign takes the form of costly informative advertising
and it helps to reduce the asymmetry of information between consumers and manufactur-
ers. Van der Made and Schoonbeek (2009) consider a campaign that increases consumers’
environmental concern through persuasive advertising. Kaufman (2014) develops a dy-
namic model of observational learning and costly search to investigate whether financial
incentives or informational campaigns are more effective at encouraging green purchasing.
These contributions thus support the environmental campaign as a policy instrument to
supplement and/or substitute other traditional environmental policies.
In our paper, the campaign induces consumers to include an additional component in
their overall valuation of quality which is captured through the key concept of relative
preferences. In this perspective, our framework is somewhat similar to Ben Elhadj and
Tarola (2015). They investigate how quality competition is affected by relative prefer-
ences. They find that the presence of such preferences may contribute to reduce pollution
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damage by inducing the polluting firm to increase its environmental quality. They also
introduce the possibility for country-specific preferences, thus providing: (i) theoretical
foundation to the empirical evidence that green consumerism changes with socio-economic
conditions; (ii) initial suggestions for the use of new environmental policy tools. Notice,
however, that they focus on relative preferences for environmental quality. We comple-
ment their analysis in two ways. First, we explicit the proactive role of environmental
campaigns in activating relative preferences and compare them with taxation. Second,
we also analyze the role played by this additional component of preferences in a scenario
where consumers initially value only the pure performance of a product rather than its
environmental impact/quality.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the case of environ-
mental qualities, while Section 3 deals with hedonic qualities. Section 4 summarizes our
main results. Section 5 discusses the assumptions of our model and provides some formal
extensions to confirm the robustness of our results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Environmental qualities
Consider two goods of different environmental quality: good H produced by firm H is
green, while good L produced by firm L is brown. We are in line with most of the
literature as we assume that consumers value the environmental quality of a product:
they all agree that good H has a higher quality than good L. There is a continuum
of consumers indexed by θ which is uniformly distributed in the interval [0,Θ]. Thus, θ
measures consumers’ valuation of environmental quality, while Θ > 0 indicates consumers’
heterogeneity as well as the average valuation of the environmental quality in the market.
As for the cost specification, we assume that producing the green good requires a
constant marginal cost c > 0, whereas the brown quality is produced at zero cost. The
additional cost c can be conceived in terms of either a more costly technology or of the
cleaning activity carried out by the green producer. Pollution creates an environmental
8However, differently from their model, we neglect quality competition as our aim is the comparative
evaluation of environmental policies in scenarios characterized by consumers that differ according to their
aprioristic preferences for quality.
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damage D which is proportional to the emissions released by the brown firm: D = e ·xL,
where xL is the quantity produced by the polluting firm. The green good is assumed to
be emission-free. Parameter e > 0 captures the marginal social cost of pollution.
We develop the following two-stage game. First, the policymaker decides which policy
instrument to use in order to reduce the environmental damage for any given level of per-
unit emissions. Then, firms compete in prices. We solve the game by backward induction:
first we solve the price competition stage for the two cases (campaign and taxation), and
then we carry out the proper comparison to find out the policymaker’s decision.
2.1 Supporting the environmental campaign
We first consider the environmental campaign. Our modelling strategy draws insights
from social psychology and in particular from the “Norm-Activation Theory” (Schwartz
1970 and 1977), one of the most widely-accepted and empirically supported theories
of moral motivation. According to this theory, the activation of personally held moral
norms influences pro-environmental behavior. As extensively reviewed by Turaga et al.
(2010), the activation of personal norms is based on two preconditions: “the individ-
ual must be aware that her action has consequences for the welfare of others [...] and
the individual must feel a personal responsibility to undertake that action” (p. 212).
Formally, we assume that the policymaker can activate these personal moral norms to
pro-environmental behavior by engaging in a costly awareness campaign. In particular,
the campaign is capable of creating a bad conscience for brown consumers while at the
same time rewarding green consumers for taking eco-friendly actions.9 Accordingly, a
consumer of type θ ∈ [0,Θ] has the following utility:
U (θ) =

θqH − pH + γ (qH − qL) if she buys the green good,
θqL − pL − γ (qH − qL) if she buys the brown good,
0 if she refrains from buying,
(1)
where qH > qL indicates the environmental qualities of the two goods, whose prices are
respectively indicated with pH and pL.
9The campaign is not meant to change consumers’ aprioristic preferences, as this would require a
long-term (and more costly) commitment, as we argued in the Introduction. Rather, its aim is to induce
consumers to incorporate an additional pro-environmental component when they purchase a product.
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The above representation does not directly include pollution. However, compared
to the standard model of vertical differentiation (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979), the
utility from buying good i = {H,L} is modified by introducing the term γ (qi − qj)
with i 6= j. It follows that the satisfaction deriving from a product variant can be
either amplified or decreased by the environmental characteristics of i as compared with
j. The intensity of such relative preferences is measured by γ ≥ 0. The stronger the
policymaker’s support for the campaign, the higher the value of γ, and thus the higher
the impact of the moral component of consumption. On the contrary, when γ → 0
we revert to the standard vertical differentiation model. In other words, the campaign
represents an indirect approach to fight pollution emissions by encouraging consumers to
increase the consumption of the green good, thus generating a green expansion effect.10
The consumer indifferent between buying the low quality good and not buying at all
is:
θL =
pL + γ (qH − qL)
qL
,
while the consumer indifferent between buying the low and the high quality good is:
θH =
pH − pL − 2γ (qH − qL)
qH − qL .
The demands for the two goods are formally written as: xL = θH−θL and xH = Θ−θH .11
Compared to the traditional setting (γ = 0), here at given prices the market share of H
increases in γ at the expense of that of L, as θH shifts leftward, while θL shifts rightward.
The green expansion effect consists of a pure stealing effect, as some consumers switch
from the brown to the green good. As we assumed that a constant marginal cost c > 0
only applies to the production of the green good, profits are given by piH = xH (pH − c)
and piL = pLxL. Additional conditions on c and γ will be specified below.
Proceeding by backward induction, we solve the price competition stage and derive the
main results, which are valid for any quality configuration. Using F.O.C.s, equilibrium
10A stream of the literature on behavioral economics focuses on the formation of pro-environmental
behaviors based on other agents’ actions (e.g., Stern, 1999; Brekke et al., 2003; Nyborg et al., 2006; Coad
et al., 2009; Kauffman, 2014). Although we take inspiration from this literature, we depart from it as
we do not endogenize this social incentive.
11The market is uncovered at equilibrium because the consumer of type θ = 0 always gets a negative
utility from buying either good.
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prices as a function of qualities are:
p∗EL =
qL[c+ Θ (qH − qL)]− 2γqH (qH − qL)
4qH − qL , p
∗E
H =
2cqH + (qH − qL) [2ΘqH + γ(3qH − qL)]
4qH − qL ,
where additional superscript E indicates that we are considering environmental quali-
ties.12 Both demands are positive if p∗EH > p
∗E
L . If instead p
∗E
H ≤ p∗EL , then the demand
for the low quality good would be zero (xL = 0) while that for the high quality good
would be xH = Θ − pL + γ (qH − qL)
qL
. We consider the case in which both firms are
active in the market. This requires the conditions provided in the following lemma to
hold. Define:
ΘE ≡ c (2qH − qL)
2qH (qH − qL) , γ
E ≡ qL [c+ Θ (qH − qL)]
2qH (qH − qL) (2)
Lemma 1 The market is uncovered and both firms are active iff Θ > ΘE and γ < γE.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We assume that the conditions reported in Lemma 1 hold throughout the paper. They
indicate that a sufficiently large consumer heterogeneity together with a non excessive
level of the moral component of consumption activated by the campaign are required
for both firms to coexist in the market. We limit our attention to such a case as we
want to reproduce a concrete situation where polluting firms compete in the market with
non-polluting ones. Equilibrium demands/outputs are:
x∗EL =
qH{qL[c+ Θ (qH − qL)]− 2γqH (qH − qL)}
(qH − qL) (4qH − qL) qL ,
x∗EH =
[γ (3qH − qL) + 2ΘqH ] (qH − qL)− c (2qH − qL)
(qH − qL) (4qH − qL) .
Notice that x∗EL decreases with γ, while x
∗E
H increases with γ. However, ∂(x
∗E
H +x
∗E
L )/∂γ <
0: total output diminishes with γ, as expected. This reveals that, in the case of envi-
ronmental qualities, the campaign gives rise to the classical trade-off between output
provision and pollution abatement that often characterizes the complex relationship be-
tween environmental and competition policies. We will come back to this point when
considering hedonic qualities. Equilibrium profits are given by:
pi∗EL =
qL
qH
(qH − qL)
(
x∗EL
)2
, pi∗EH = (qH − qL)
(
x∗EH
)2
.
12This will be used throughout the paper to distinguish the present scenario from the hedonic qualities
scenario that will be analyzed in the next section.
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The social welfare as a function of γ writes in a compact way as:
SW ∗E (γ) = pi∗EL + pi
∗E
H + CS
∗E
L + CS
∗E
H − e · x∗EL − s
γ2
2
,
where e · x∗EL is the environmental damage, while sγ
2
2
is the cost for the campaign, which
is assumed to be convex in γ.13 This captures the idea that it is increasingly costly for
the policymaker to affect consumers’ preferences through the comparative information
provided by the campaign.14 Parameter s > 0 is inversely related to the effectiveness of
the campaign effort. The social welfare is concave in γ only for sufficiently high values of
s. In particular, this requires:
s >
(qH − qL) (12q3H + 19q2HqL − 13qHq2L + 2q3L)
qL (4qH − qL)2
≡ s. (3)
We assume that s > s and compute the optimal level of γ that maximizes social welfare:15
γ∗E =
2eq2H (4qH − qL) + qL[2c(6qHqL − 10q2H − q2L) + ΘqH (8qH − 3qL) (qH − qL)]
sqL (4qH − qL)2 − (qH − qL) (12q3H + 2q3L − 13qHq2L + 19q2HqL)
. (4)
Taking into account that γ∗E has to be non-negative and that the conditions reported in
Lemma 1 have to be satisfied, we find:
Lemma 2 γ∗E ∈ [0, γE) when e ∈ [max{0, eγE}, eγE).
Proof. See the Appendix, where one can also find the precise values of eγE and eγE.
Hence, the optimal policy is γ = 0 as long as the emission level is very low since the
positive effect resulting from the emission reduction does not compensate for the cost
of the campaign. In contrast, for very high values of the emission, the policymaker sets
γ = γE, whose expression is reported in (2). Only for intermediate levels of e the optimal
policy is given by γ = γ∗E. The previous discussion is summarized into:
Remark 1 The government optimally sets: (i) γ = 0 when e < max{0, eγE}; (ii) γ =
γ∗E when e ∈ [max{0, eγE}, eγE); (iii) γ = γE when e ≥ eγE.
13The precise expression of CS∗EL and CS
∗E
H are very long and therefore not reported in the text.
They are available in Section 1 of the online Supplementary Material, together with CS∗∗EL and CS
∗∗E
H ,
which are the corresponding expressions for the taxation case.
14This cost specification is congruent with the literature; see, inter alii, van der Made and Schoonbeek
(2009) and Sartzetakis et al. (2012). Alternatively, we can think of the environmental campaign as a
sort of social innovation since it creates an extra-value for the green good by making consumers aware of
the relative environmental impact of the goods. Therefore, in line with most of the literature on R&D,
we consider convex costs.
15We discuss the role of γ and s in Subsection 5.2. In particular, we consider what happens for s < s.
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2.2 Taxing the polluting good
Let us now consider the traditional taxation instrument. According to social psychology
(e.g., Frey, 1997; Turaga et al., 2010) as well as widely discussed in the public eco-
nomic literature (e.g., Nyborg et al., 2006; Brekke et al., 2003), when the government
adopts a direct taxation policy to reduce pollution, the influence of moral motivation
can decrease.16 Accordingly, we assume that when the policymaker decides to levy a tax
proportional to the polluting emission on the brown firm, then the pro-environmental
component of consumption is not relevant, i.e. γ → 0.17 Formally, inserting γ = 0 in
(1) is equivalent to consider a standard vertical differentiation model, where θL = pL/qL
is the consumer indifferent between buying the low quality good and not buying at all,
while θH = (pH − pL)/qH − qL is the consumer indifferent between buying the low and
the high quality good. Demands are given by xL = θH − θL and xH = Θ− θH .
The green good is produced at cost c, whereas the polluting good is subject to a
per-unit tax t. Thus, t can be interpreted as the tax differential between the two firms,
while c represents the marginal production cost differential. Profit functions are therefore
piL = (pL − t)xL and piH = (pH − c)xH . Price competition yields:
p∗∗EH =
qH [2c+ t+ 2Θ (qH − qL)]
4qH − qL > 0, p
∗∗E
L =
cqL + 2tqH + qLΘ (qH − qL)
4qH − qL > 0.
Let us now define:
t
E ≡ qL [c+ Θ(qH − qL)]
(2qH − qL) ; (5)
Lemma 3 Both firms stay in the market iff Θ > ΘE and t < t
E
.
Proof. See the Appendix, and recall that ΘE is defined in (2).
We assume that the conditions reported in Lemma 3 hold throughout the paper. They
indicate that a sufficiently large consumer heterogeneity together with a non excessive
16Frey (1997) argues that, although taxes and fees increase the economic incentives to contribute to
the public cause, they tend to reduce the individual internal or intrinsic motivation. In Nyborg et al.
(2006), an environmental tax is interpreted as taking responsibility away from the individual and this
can crowd out moral motivation.
17We acknowledge that such a change in preferences represents a strong assumption. In the online
Supplementary Material (Section 3) we extend our baseline model by including an initial level of personal
moral norms, independent of the government’s intervention. We prove that our qualitative results hold.
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taxation are required for both firms to coexist in the market. Equilibrium demands are:
x∗∗EL =
qH [cqL − t (2qH − qL) + ΘqL(qH − qL)]
(qH − qL) (4qH − qL) qL ,
x∗∗EH =
2ΘqH(qH − qL)− c(2qH − qL) + tqH
(4qH − qL) (qH − qL) .
Notice that ∂x∗∗EL /∂t < 0 and ∂x
∗∗E
H /∂t > 0, as expected. Moreover, ∂(x
∗∗E
H +x
∗∗E
L )/∂t <
0: total output decreases with t, and consumer surplus is therefore negatively affected by
environmental taxation. Equilibrium profits are given by:
pi∗∗EL =
qL
qH
(qH − qL)
(
x∗∗EL
)2
, pi∗∗EH = (qH − qL)
(
x∗∗EH
)2
.
Social welfare as a function of t writes in a compact form as:
SW ∗E (t) = pi∗∗EL + pi
∗∗E
H + CS
∗∗E
L + CS
∗∗E
H − e · x∗∗EL + t · x∗∗EL .
Algebraic calculations show that it is concave in t. The optimal tax rate is:
t∗E =
e (4qH − qL) (2qH − qL) + qL[ΘqL(qH − qL)− 2c (2qH − qL)]
qH (4qH − 3qL) . (6)
Taking into account that t∗E has to be non-negative, and that the conditions from Lemma
3 have to be satisfied, we demonstrate that:
Lemma 4 t∗E ∈ [0, tE) when e ∈ [max{0, etE} , etE).
Proof. See the Appendix, where we also report the precise values of etE and etE.
For low values of e, the optimal tax is set to zero because the negative effect on
output is in absolute value stronger than the positive effect obtained by reducing pollution
emissions. On the contrary, for high values of e, the optimal tax is t
E
- whose value is
expressed in (5) - and the profit of the low brown quality firm tends to zero. However,
it is relatively easy to demonstrate that the government would prefer to leave an ε → 0
to the polluting firm, and then still have a duopoly, instead of pushing it off the market.
We summarize the optimal tax policy in the following remark:
Remark 2 The government optimally sets: (i) t = 0 when e < max
{
0, etE
}
; (ii) t =
t∗E when e ∈ [max{0, etE} , etE); (iii) t = tE when e ≥ etE.
Remark 2 confirms that the optimal tax rate is non-decreasing in the intensity of
polluting emissions captured by parameter e.
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2.3 Comparing the two instruments under environmental qual-
ities
We compare the social efficiency of taxation versus campaign to find out which policy
instrument should be adopted by the policymaker. First of all, we need to rank the
threshold values of e that define the regions where different levels of social welfare occur.
In the Appendix we detail all the possible cases and evaluate the relative comparisons.
The following proposition summarizes the most important results. Let
Θ1 =
2c(28q4H − 53q3HqL + 36q2Hq2L − 10qHq3L + q4L)
qH (4qH − 3qL) (qH − qL) (10q2H − 6qHqL + q2L)
,
Θ2 =
2c (2qH − qL)2
qH (4q2H − 7qHqL + 3q2L)
, with Θ1 < Θ2.
Proposition 1 Assume that consumers value the environmental quality of the goods:
(i) when Θ ≤ Θ1, the tax instrument is socially more efficient than the campaign.
(ii) When Θ ∈ (Θ1,Θ2), the tax instrument prevails as long as the cost of the campaign
is sufficiently high. For a relatively low cost of the campaign, taxation is preferred
only if the quality ratio qH/qL is not excessive. When the quality ratio is high,
there exists a threshold level for the polluting emissions above which the campaign
is preferred.
(iii) When Θ ≥ Θ2, the campaign is socially more efficient than the tax instrument,
unless both the cost of the campaign and the emission levels are sufficiently high.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The above proposition reveals that an indirect instrument such as an environmental
campaign can be more efficient than a direct tax levied on the brown good. The two
preconditions for this to occur are: (i) the cost of the campaign is not too excessive,
and (ii) the average valuation of the environmental quality in the market is sufficiently
high (Θ ≥ Θ1). While the first precondition is trivial, the second one is less obvious. In
particular, it highlights that the green expansion effect of the environmental campaign
increases in Θ: the higher the average valuation for the environmental quality, the larger
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the number of consumers willing to buy the green good. For a given cost s, an increase
in Θ improves the effectiveness of the campaign in inducing some consumers to switch
from the brown to the green product, thereby reducing the polluting emissions.
More precisely, for relatively low values of Θ (Θ ≤ Θ1), the green expansion effect
is almost irrelevant, and taxing the polluting product is preferred from the social stand-
point. In contrast, for high values of Θ (Θ ≥ Θ2), such an effect becomes crucial and
the campaign turns out to be more efficient than the tax, provided that its cost is not
exaggerated. Finally, when Θ ∈ (Θ1,Θ2), the green expansion effect takes intermediate
values and the comparison between the two instruments includes more elements which
tend to either reinforce or stifle the relevancy of such an effect. Again, taxation prevails
when s is high. On the contrary, when the campaign is relatively affordable, we find that
the quality ratio qH/qL may compensate for Θ. In particular, when qH/qL is sufficiently
high, i.e. the brown good is very distant from the green one in terms of the quality valued
by environmentally concerned consumers, then the campaign can be welfare improving as
compared to the tax instrument, especially if e exceeds a certain value.18 The explanation
relies on the fact that a relatively inexpensive campaign can reduce the consumption of
a good whose (environmental) quality is very low, and this becomes even more relevant
when the polluting emission that it releases is considered as extremely dangerous.
3 Hedonic qualities
Is it always the case that consumers prefer environmentally friendly goods rather than
polluting ones? What would happen if brown goods outperformed its green counterparts,
and consumers only cared about the performance of a certain good? In this section
we address these issues by assuming that consumers value the hedonic quality of the
goods above all else. It follows that, in this new scenario, good H is of high quality yet
brown, while good L is of low quality yet green. More precisely, good H has a higher
performance than good L but it emits pollution, thereby generating the environmental
18Precise threshold values of both s and qH/qL are reported in the Appendix (see Proof of Proposition
1). Moreover, the extended version presented in Section 3 of the online Supplementary Material demon-
strates that our qualitative results are independent of the quality specification (although an increase in
qH/qL favors the campaign vis a` vis the taxation instrument).
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damage D = e · xH , where xH is the quantity produced by brown firm H. Recall that
the green good is emission-free by assumption.
The government may intervene to reduce the environmental damage for any given level
of the per-unit emissions by either taxing the polluting good, or by creating environmental
awareness through the campaign. Accordingly, we develop another two-stage game in
which the policymaker decides at the first stage whether to intervene and which policy
instrument to use, having anticipated the price game played by firms in the second stage.
The formal analysis is only apparently similar to the one previously presented. In-
deed, we are about to show that the environmental campaign has different implications,
especially in terms of equilibrium market coverage and consumer surplus. For this reason,
we illustrate the complete analysis of the two different policy instruments.
3.1 Supporting the environmental campaign
Consider first the environmental campaign. As introduced before, a new term appears in
the indirect utility, namely γ > 0, which multiplies the quality gap. This time, however,
activating relative preferences implies a reduction in the utility from buying the high
(but brown) quality good and a simultaneous increase in the utility from buying the low
(but green) quality one. Hence, consumers experience a conflict between their initial
valuation of quality and the relative preferences. Formally, this is represented by the
following utility for a consumer of type θ ∈ [0,Θ]:
U (θ) =

θqH − pH − γ (qH − qL) , if she buys the high quality good,
θqL − pL + γ (qH − qL) , if she buys the low quality good,
0, if she refrains from buying.
The hedonic qualities of the two goods are indicated by qH > qL. Parameter θ now
measures consumers’ valuation for the hedonic quality, and Θ > 0 captures consumer
heterogeneity as well as the average valuation of the hedonic quality in the market.
Indifferent consumers are respectively given by:
θL =
pL − γ (qH − qL)
qL
, θH =
pH − pL + 2γ (qH − qL)
qH − qL .
Demands are again xL = θH − θL and xH = Θ − θH . Notice that, given prices, the
market share of the green firm L increases in γ. This happens for two reasons. On the
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one hand, the consumer indifferent between not buying at all and buying the low quality
(θL) shifts leftward. On the other hand, the consumer indifferent between buying the
low quality and the high quality (θH) shifts rightward. In the case of hedonic qualities,
the green expansion effect does not consist only on gaining market share at the expense
of the brown rival (stealing effect), but it also includes a market coverage effect. This
latter effect refers to the fact that some consumers that were not buying in absence of the
campaign are now willing to buy the good L. Hence, contrary to the previous scenario,
the market can (hypothetically) be covered, as the consumer of type θ = 0 may have a
positive utility from buying good L if γ (qH − qL) > pL. However, we can show that this
is not compatible with pH > pL.
19 We focus therefore on the uncovered market situation,
although the market coverage increases in γ (θL moves to the left).
Producing the low quality (green) good still requires a per-unit cost c > 0, while the
high quality (brown) is produced at zero cost.20 According to the previous discussion,
profit functions can be expressed as piH = xH · pH and piL = (pL − c)xL. Equilibrium
prices can be easily obtained:
p∗HL =
2cqH + (qH − qL) (2γqH + ΘqL)
4qH − qL , p
∗H
H =
cqH + (qH − qL) [2ΘqH − γ(3qH − qL)]
4qH − qL ,
where additional superscript H indicates hedonic qualities. Let us now define:
ΘH ≡ c (2qH − qL)
qL (qH − qL) , γ
H ≡ min
{
Θ (2qH − qL) (qH − qL)− cqH
(5qH − qL) (qH − qL) ,
2cqH + Θ (qH − qL) qL
(2qH − qL) (qH − qL)
}
.
(7)
Lemma 5 The market is uncovered and both firms are active iff Θ > ΘH and
γ < γH .
19Formally, θL < 0 requires a relatively high value of γ, and this is not compatible with pH > pL,
which holds for a low value of γ. We discuss in Subsection 5.2 the consequences of extending the analysis
to larger values of the parameter γ.
20This cost structure requires an additional specification for the case of hedonic qualities, as it seems at
odds with the standard literature on vertical differentiation according to which producing the high quality
good entails a higher cost than the cost for the low quality good (see Cremer and Thisse, 1994, among
others). In our model we adopt a simplified form in which production costs only derive from producing an
environmentally friendly good. In alternative, one could consider a cost function ci = ki+Ei where (i) ki
denotes the hedonic-quality specific cost for firm i, with kH > kL and (ii) Ei denotes the environmental
quality specific cost, with EH < EL. Since kH > kL always holds in traditional models of vertical
differentiation, the only way to obtain cH < cL is to assume that (EL−EH) > (kH − kL). Without any
loss of generality, we write cL = c > cH = 0.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
We assume that the conditions reported in Lemma 5 hold throughout the paper.
Equilibrium demands and profits are then easily found:
x∗HL =
qH [(qH − qL) (2γqH − qL)− c (2qH − qL)]
qL (4qH − qL) (qH − qL) , x
∗H
H =
p∗HH
(qH − qL) ;
pi∗HL =
qL
qH
(qH − qL)
(
x∗HL
)2
, pi∗HH =
(
x∗HH
)2
(qH − qL) .
By construction, ∂x∗HL /∂γ > 0 and ∂x
∗H
H /∂γ < 0. However, differently from the previ-
ous case, total output increases in γ,as ∂(x∗HL + x
∗H
H )/∂γ > 0. This is due to a green
expansion effect that combines the stealing effect with the market coverage effect, as we
discussed above. In the case of hedonic qualities consumer surplus tends to increase in
γ, meaning that the environmental campaign is effective in reducing polluting emissions
without jeopardizing the total amount of the good available for consumption. Hence, the
campaign may contribute to navigate the trade-off between output provision and emis-
sions reductions that typically characterizes the taxation instrument. Remember that
such a result crucially depends on the fact that the green good is emission-free, as we
assumed in our model. However, this would continue to hold when considering relatively
low emissions coming from the green producer.
The social welfare function writes in a compact way as:
SW ∗H (γ) = pi∗HL + pi
∗H
H + CS
∗H
L + CS
∗H
H − e · x∗HH − s
γ2
2
,
where the environmental damage is e · x∗HH , given that it is now firm H the one that
pollutes.21 The social welfare function is concave in γ if and only if s > s, where s is
defined in (3). We compute the optimal γ level which maximizes social welfare:
γ∗H =
qH (cqHqL − 12cq2H − 3Θq3L + cq2L + 11ΘqHq2L − 8Θq2HqL) + e qL (qL − 4qH) (qL − 3qH)
s qL (qL − 4qH)2 − (qH − qL) (12q3H + 2q3L − 13qHq2L + 19q2HqL)
.
(8)
Given that γ∗H ≥ 0 and that the conditions of Lemma 5 have to be satisfied, we find:
Lemma 6 Assume γH =
Θ (2qH − qL) (qH − qL)− cqH
(5qH − qL) (qH − qL) . Then γ
∗H ∈ [0, γH) when e ∈
[eγH , eγH).
21The precise expression of CS∗HL and CS
∗H
H are available in Section 1 of the online Supplementary
Material, together with the corresponding expressions for the taxation case, CS∗∗HL and CS
∗∗H
H .
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Proof. See the Appendix, where one can also find the precise values of eγH and eγH . Sim-
ilar conditions would have been obtained by using γH =
2cqH + Θ (qH − qL) qL
(2qH − qL) (qH − qL) without
changing the qualitative results of our paper.
The optimal policy is γ = 0 as long as the emission level is very low since the positive
effect linked to the emission reduction does not compensate for the cost of the campaign.
In contrast, for very high values of the emission, the optimal policy is γ = γH . Notice
that at γ = γH the demand of the high quality firm is still positive (and hence its profit).
The previous discussion is summarized into:
Remark 3 The government optimally sets: (i) γ = 0 when e < eγH ; (ii) γ = γ∗H when
e ∈ [eγH , eγH); (iii) γ = γH when e > eγH .
3.2 Taxing the polluting good
We consider again a standard model of vertical differentiation model, where the high
quality good is now the polluting one.22 As before, indifferent consumers are given by
θL = pL/qL and θH = (pH−pL)/qH−qL, and producing the green good requires a constant
marginal cost c > 0, whereas the brown quality is produced at zero cost. However, the
polluting good is subject to a per-unit tax t. Profit functions are therefore given by
piL = (pL − c)xL and piH = (pH − t)xH . Equilibrium prices as a function of qualities are:
p∗∗HL =
qLΘ (qH − qL) + tqL + 2cqH
4qH − qL , p
∗∗H
H =
qH [2Θ (qH − qL) + 2t+ c]
4qH − qL .
Let us now define:
t
H ≡ qH [2Θ (qH − qL) + c]
(2qH − qL) ; (9)
Lemma 7 Both firms are active in the market iff Θ > ΘH and t < t
H
.
Proof. See the Appendix, and recall that ΘH is defined in (7).
Equilibrium demands/outputs are:
x∗∗HL =
qH [qL (t+ ΘqH −ΘqL)− c (2qH − qL)]
(4qH − qL) (qH − qL) qL ,
x∗∗HH =
qH [2Θ(qH − qL) + c]− t (2qH − qL)
(4qH − qL) (qH − qL) ,
22Note that, in line with the environmental preferences scenario, we assume that adopting the taxation
policy implies that the moral component of consumption is not relevant, i.e. γ → 0.
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and they are always positive under the conditions specified in Lemma 7. By construction,
∂x∗∗H /∂t < 0 and ∂x
∗∗
L /∂t > 0. Moreover, ∂(x
∗∗
H + x
∗∗
L )/∂t < 0: taxation always shrinks
total output. Equilibrium profits are given by:
pi∗∗HL =
qL
qH
(qH − qL)
(
x∗∗HL
)2
, pi∗∗HH = (qH − qL)
(
x∗∗HH
)2
.
Social welfare as a function of t writes in a compact form as:
SW ∗∗H (t) = pi∗∗HL + pi
∗∗H
H + CS
∗∗H
L + CS
∗∗H
H − e · x∗∗HH + t · x∗∗HH .
Algebraic calculations reveal that SW ∗∗H (t) is concave in t. The optimal tax rate is:
t∗H =
e(4qH − qL) (2qH − qL)− qH [Θ (4qH − 3qL) (qH − qL) + 2c (2qH − qL)]
qH (4qH − 3qL) . (10)
Taking into account that t∗H has to be non-negative, and that the conditions appearing
in Lemma 7 have to be satisfied:
Lemma 8 t∗H ∈ [0, tH) when e ∈ [etH , etH).
Proof. See the Appendix, where one can find also the precise values of etH and etH .
Recall also that the precise expression of t
H
can be found in (9).
Remark 4 The government optimally sets: (i) t = 0 when e < etH ; (ii) t = t∗H when
e ∈ [etH , etH); (iii) t = tH when e > etH .
When t = t
H
, the profit of the high quality firm tends to zero. Also in this case it
is relatively easy to prove that the government would prefer to leave an ε → 0 to the
polluting firm, instead of pushing it off the market.
3.3 Comparing the two instruments under hedonic qualities
As in the previous scenario, in order to compare taxation versus campaign, we need to
rank the threshold values of e that define the interval regions where different levels of
social welfare occur. In the Appendix we detail all the possible cases. The following
proposition summarizes our results:
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Proposition 2 Assume that consumers initially value the hedonic quality of the goods.
If the cost of the campaign is sufficiently high (s > s), then the tax instrument is
always preferred to the environmental campaign in order to maximize total surplus.
Proof. See the Appendix.
When the social welfare associated to the environmental campaign is concave (s > s),
the government always prefers the taxation instrument. Consumers’ concern about the
hedonic quality of goods prevails over the moral dimension that may have been activated
by the campaign. A direct instrument like a tax on polluting goods proves therefore to
be more efficient in terms of total welfare. This result is in accordance with Proposition
1 where we argue that the environmental campaign is more efficient than taxation only
when consumers’ valuation of the environmental quality is sufficiently high.
Nonetheless, when we examined the impact of the campaign, we have noticed that
the green expansion effect consists of two components, a market stealing effect (some
consumers switch from the brown to the green good), and a market coverage effect (some
of the consumers who did not buy before now decide to buy the green good). Total
output may therefore increase. Then:
Corollary 1 The campaign may be preferred to the tax instrument if the primary focus
of the policymaker is the consumer surplus.
If the green product is emission-free, the environmental campaign does not generate
conflicts between competition authorities (aiming at fostering competition) and envi-
ronmental authorities (aiming at reducing pollution); as γ increases, one observes the
reduction of the emissions but not at the cost of milder competition. This is an impor-
tant result of our analysis, especially because antitrust agencies often adopt consumer
surplus as a measure of social welfare.
Notice finally that, under the assumptions of our model, taxation can completely
eliminate the high quality polluting firm H (or leave it with zero profit), while the en-
vironmental campaign entails a cost s which makes such an outcome undesirable. If the
aim of the policymaker is to reduce pollution emission as much as possible, then taxation
provides the most effective tool.
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4 A tale of two worlds
Our purpose was to examine social welfare under two different policy instruments, both
aiming at reducing pollution emissions, in two different “worlds”, one populated by en-
vironmentally conscious citizens, while the other by those interested in the pure perfor-
mance of the goods, which can be at odds with the environmental quality. The main
conclusion that one can draw when comparing Proposition 1 with Proposition 2 is that
consumers’ preliminary sensitivity towards the environment is a necessary condition for
the environmental campaign to prove more efficient than the pollution tax. In both our
worlds, the environmental campaign is effective in reducing pollution emissions. Indeed,
it shifts the buying decision of (at least) some consumers from the brown to the green
good, independently of consumers’ concern about the environment. However, when com-
pared to other instruments like the pollution tax, the campaign may not prove to be the
welfare maximizing policy when the environmental concern is low and consumers mainly
care about the pure performance of a product. In our model, such a preliminary concern
affects the same definition of quality. For example, when consumers’ hedonic valuation
prevails over their environmental dimension, the green expansion effect generated by the
campaign does not compensate for its cost. A traditional instrument like the pollution
tax, which is directly levied on the production of the polluting good, turns out to be more
efficient. In addition, it represents a net gain for the government. For the environmental
campaign to be socially preferable, we need a scenario in which consumers have already
at least some positive valuation of the environmental quality.
In real world terms, our analysis suggests the adoption of country-specific policy
instruments. Extreme examples of what we have in mind are provided by Sweden and
China. While the former is an early adopter of sustainable thinking and one of the
few industrialized countries to have reduced its carbon emissions, the latter may well
represent an example of a country where environmental protection is not a main concern.23
23Back in the 1960s, Sweden recognized that the rapid loss of natural resources had to
be confronted, and took a lead in organizing the first UN conference on the environment,
held in Stockholm in 1972. For further details on Swedish environmental policies, visit
www.sweden.se/eng/Home/Society/Sustainability/Facts/Environment.
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Empirical support for our statement comes from the Eurostat statistics on EU countries’
tax revenues on pollution as a percentage of GDP: in 2011 the EU average was 0.11,
while Sweden was well below this value (0.05).24 On the contrary, China suffers from
severe environmental damages to natural resources associated with the country’s rapid
economic successes. Recent measures taken by the Chinese government aim at improving
its environmental situation. However, this is mainly done by resorting to traditional
policy instruments.25
We would also like to point out that our policy implications are based on total social
welfare as a measure of a social well-being. While this is a quite standard measure of
welfare, a policymaker may decide to put different weights on consumer and producer
surplus when evaluating a policy intervention. Our results may therefore change if we
consider consumer surplus as an alternative measure of welfare. Indeed, as put forward
in the model, taxation shrinks total output, thus implying that consumer surplus de-
creases when the government applies such a tool. This holds under both hedonic and
environmental qualities. As for the environmental campaign, it has a similar effect but
only under environmental qualities. On the contrary, under hedonic qualities, the ef-
fect of the campaign is to increase total output, thus expanding consumer surplus. This
means that if one attaches a relatively high weight to consumer surplus, then the envi-
ronmental campaign may surpass the taxation instrument in terms of efficiency even if
consumers initially value the hedonic component of consumption, provided the emission
level associated to the green product is sufficiently low.
5 Discussion and robustness check
The purpose of this section is to better motivate our methodological decision to adopt
vertical differentiation and discuss our technical assumptions. We also insert relative
24Clearly, these numbers cannot be taken as strong evidence supporting our results, given that a low
tax revenue in a country could also be due to tax evasion or simply a mild environmental policy by that
government. However, at least looking at Sweden (and Finland as well with 0.06) we can reasonably
conclude that this is linked to a strong environmental concern of consumers. For further details visit
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/pdf/EB summary EB752.pdf
25See for instance a recent press article in The Guardian pointing out China’s new five-year
cleanup strategy based on environmental tax on heavy polluters. For more information, visit
www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/04/china-green-tax-polluters.
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preferences in a simple horizontally differentiated duopoly and discuss the differences
between the two modeling strategies.26
5.1 Vertical versus horizontal differentiation
The starting point of our paper is related to the existence of two vertically differenti-
ated “worlds”, depending on whether consumers prefer the environmental quality or the
hedonic quality of a product. We acknowledge in most societies environmentally and
non environmentally concerned consumers coexist with one another. For instance, imag-
ine that a fraction δ of consumers cares about the environmental quality, whereas the
complementary fraction (1− δ) values the hedonic quality. We reckon that such an ex-
tension would not add much in terms of results. We conjecture that there would exist
a δ−threshold such that the campaign would prove to be more efficient than the tax
instrument as long as the fraction of environmentally concerned consumers is sufficiently
high (and vice versa).
A unified scenario in which consumers reveal heterogeneous environmental concern is
usually represented in horizontally differentiated models. Instead, we opted for vertical
differentiation in order to capture the idea that all consumers, although being hetero-
geneous in their willingness to pay for quality, agree on the quality ranking of the two
goods. Our setting is relevant in a wide range of situations in which goods are imperfect
substitutes and their qualities (either in terms of polluting emissions or in terms of pure
performance) are objectively different. In particular, by adopting two alternative defini-
tions of quality, we showed that our results crucially depended on the degree of consumer
heterogeneity, which in turn was based on the specific type of quality that we considered.
A relatively simple model of horizontal differentiation would not have allowed us
to obtain similar results. Consider, for instance, an extended version of the Hotelling
(1929) linear city in which two firms produce a homogeneous good (homogeneous in
terms of intrinsic quality) and locate in the interval [0, 1], where the location represents
the environmental impact of the good. Under horizontal differentiation, at equal prices
26In the online Supplementary Material, we also present an extension to the baseline model in order
to show that our most important results continue to hold when consumers are endowed with an initial
level of green awareness which is independent from the policymaker’s intervention.
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some consumers would buy the green good and others the brown good.
In Section 2 of the online Supplementary Material we develop in details this horizontal
differentiation extension. Here we only provide a brief sketch of the model and its main
results in order to make a comparison with our vertical differentiation approach. Two
firms, G and B, are located at the endpoints of the interval [0, 1]. Firm G is located
in 0 and produces a green product (G), while firm B is located in 1 and produces a
brown product (B). Let pG and pB denote respectively the prices of products G and B,
with production being costless only for the brown producer. As for the demand side,
we assume a continuum of consumers of mass 1 uniformly distributed along the interval
[0, 1]. Each of them buys one unit of the good. The utility of a consumer indexed by
x ∈ [0, 1] is:
U (x) =
{
v − rx− pG + γ (1− 0) if buys G,
v − r (1− x)− pB − γ (1− 0) if buys B, (11)
where v is the intrinsic quality of the goods and r represents the linear transportation cost
measuring the substitutability between the two goods. In line with our model, buying
the green (brown) good amplifies (reduces) the satisfaction of consumption by the term
γ (1− 0). This term depends on the environmental distance between the goods (1− 0)
as well as on the level of personal moral norms that favor pro-environmental behaviors,
captured by γ ≥ 0. As in the baseline model, γ is induced by the policymaker through the
support of a costly environmental campaign. When the tax instrument is implemented γ
goes to 0. Profit functions and social welfare replicate those in the baseline model. The
environmental damage derives again only from the production activity of the brown firm.
By replicating the two-stage game, we evaluate the social efficiency of the two policy
instruments. We prove that taxation is more efficient than the campaign for a relatively
wide interval region. The campaign prevails only when both its cost and the cost for
producing the green product are sufficiently low, provided the emissions takes an in-
termediate value. Notice that, although it is still possible to find an interval region in
which the policymaker prefers to adopt the campaign, this mainly depends upon a cost-
effectiveness analysis, not upon consumers’ environmental concern. In our baseline model
the impact of Θ was in a certain way “asymmetric”. The higher its value, the higher
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the consumer heterogeneity, but also the higher the average (and maximal) willingness
to pay for quality. This undoubtedly favors the high quality firm (which in our frame-
work could be either the green or the brown firm). In the Hotelling model parameter
r could somewhat measure consumers’ heterogeneity, given that when it increases the
two goods are perceived as more differentiated. However, r acts in a symmetric way, as
it does not convey any particular advantage to a specific producer. For this reason, a
“horizontal” measure of consumer heterogeneity does not play any role in comparing the
social efficiency of the two policy instruments.
Contributions that are close to the formal model presented in this section are those
by Conrad (2005) and Esp`ınola-Arredondo and Zhao (2012), who extend the Hotelling
duopoly model by taking into account green consumerism. Moreover, they also assume
that the market is covered, thus simplifying the formal analysis.27 In terms of a com-
parison with our baseline model, the main drawback of considering market coverage is
that total output at equilibrium is fixed. It follows that the comparison between the two
instruments could be biased in favor of the taxation instrument as it no longer entail the
negative effect of shrinking total output.
5.2 Effectiveness and cost of the environmental campaign
In the baseline model we restricted our attention to sufficiently low levels of γ. This
ensured that both firms remained active in the market and that the initial quality ranking
did not reverse. In particular, in the case of environmental qualities, if γ > γE the low
(brown) quality firm would leave the market. In contrast, with hedonic qualities, if γ > γH
the low (green) quality firm would charge a higher price than the rival, and eventually
we would observe a quality switch. Therefore, in order to keep the initial ranking of
hedonic qualities, we assume that the campaign cannot be too “revolutionary”, i.e. it
does not induce all consumers to switch to the green good.28 However, our results are
27The assumption of market coverage eliminates the possibility of investigating what would happen in
an uncovered market (that would represent two local monopolies) or in a market covered at the limit (i.e.
a corner solution that marks the transition from the configuration of a fully served market to that of a
partially served market). This would nonetheless complicate the formal analysis because of the presence
of different subcases depending on the parameters at stake (first of all v).
28This assumption is realistic as it captures a situation in which at least part of the population of
consumers would not completely change their consumption behavior in response of campaign.
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robust to this assumption. On the one hand, under environmental qualities, it does
not make sense to further pursue the campaign. Once the brown firm is pushed off the
market, then emissions reach their minimal level. On the other hand, under hedonic
qualities, extending the analysis to higher levels of γ significantly alters the equilibrium
market structure. In particular, this implies shifting first from an uncovered to a covered
duopoly market (at the limit), and then to a monopoly dominated by the low green
quality firm.29 Yet again, our main results hold. In the case of hedonic qualities, the tax
instrument is still more efficient than the campaign. In fact, recall that pursuing high
levels of the environmental campaign requires increasing costs.
Turning our attention to the cost of the campaign, we assumed that s > s, thus
ensuring the concavity of the social welfare function. This allowed us to determine the
optimal investment level in the campaign. For s < s, the social welfare function is convex
in γ, meaning that the optimal campaign level is reached either in γ = 0 or in γ = γ.
Considering hedonic qualities, it is possible to demonstrate that, when s < s, there are
conditions for which a relatively cheap campaign can be more efficient than the pollution
tax. In particular, this is more likely to happen for high values of Θ, i.e. when consumers’
ex-ante heterogeneity is prominent. However, as both goods are still on the market, the
emission level should not be perceived as too dangerous by the policymaker, otherwise
a more direct taxation instrument is to be preferred.30 In contrast, with environmental
qualities our qualitative results do not change, being the campaign more efficient than
the tax instrument in an interval region comparable to that of the baseline model.
6 Conclusions
We have considered two different worlds, depending on whether consumers are ex ante af-
fected by environmental concerns or not. We have compared the adoption of conventional
tax on the emission of pollution with an environmental campaign which stigmatizes the
29For formal details, see Mantovani el al. (2016), where the full set of market equilibria under relative
preferences for hedonic quality is characterized.
30The comparison between the different social welfare expressions when s ≤ s is not present in the
Appendix. As the Proof of Proposition 1 is already very long, we decided to skip the formal demonstration
of ancillary results which are not at the core of our paper. They are, however, available upon request.
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consumption of the brown good, while at the same time rewarding the consumption of
the green product. Both policy instruments are effective in reducing polluting emissions.
However, their relative efficiency from a social welfare point of view changes according to
the consumer’s environmental sensitivity. We have proved that, if consumers value the
hedonic dimension of quality above all, then the tax instrument is more efficient than the
campaign. On the contrary, when consumers appreciate the environmental dimension
of consumption, the campaign may be preferred, but only if the average valuation for
the environmental quality is sufficiently high. Interestingly, we have also found that, if
consumer surplus were the primary focus of the policymaker, then a campaign could be
more efficient than taxation even when consumers value the hedonic quality.
In the last part we have discussed the robustness of the main assumptions of our model
together with its main limitations. All in all, we believe that our paper represents an
interesting starting point to evaluate the relative performance of environmental awareness
campaign vis a` vis traditional policy instruments. Additional theoretical and empirical
research must be carried out with the aim of providing accurate results, thereby helping
the policymaker in designing the best suited instrument to curb pollution emission while
achieving the highest level of social welfare.
On theoretical grounds, there are at least two interesting extensions of our research
that deserve attention. The first one is related to the potential dynamic efficiency of
environmental campaigns. Indeed, there exist situations in which consumers character-
ized by a strong bias towards the hedonic quality seem not to respond to environmental
campaigns, at least in the short run. Still, although the campaign may not pay off in
the short term, environmental concern may gradually become ingrained in the social con-
sciousness, especially if it is combined with an investment in environmental education.
This “planting of the seeds” may contribute to the success of future environmental cam-
paigns. Schumacher (2015) investigates the surge in environmental culture across the
globe. He finds that only when societies reach a certain level of economic development,
they decide to invest in adopting an environmental culture. Thus, we should compare the
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static efficiency of the tax with the dynamic efficiency of the campaign.31 In addition,
dynamic models can be used to explore the idea that the cost of the campaign could
decrease over time. This is particularly related to the case of expensive and lengthy
environmental educational campaigns that aim at redefining the concept of quality.
The second extension regards the possibility to allow for price discrimination. Liu
and Serfes (2005) consider a vertically differentiated covered duopoly in which firms can
either develop or acquire a database with the aim of segmenting consumers into distinct
groups. Firms can then tailor their prices to each consumer segment (third-degree price
discrimination). The authors show that (i) only the high quality firm has an incentive
to acquire information and practice price discrimination; (ii) not only its profit, but also
social (and consumer) welfare monotonically increase with the information precision. In
terms of our problem, the effect of price discrimination on social welfare would depend
on consumer environmental concern. Under environmental qualities, the incentive for the
high-and-green quality firm to price discriminate would be a fortiori welfare improving
with information precision. In contrast, under hedonic qualities, where the high quality
firm is the brown firm, this kind of price discrimination may have ambiguous welfare
effects as it would increase pollution with respect to uniform pricing.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
To start with, notice that:
p∗EL > 0 ⇐⇒ γ <
qL [c+ Θ (qH − qL)]
2qH (qH − qL) ≡ γ
E,
p∗EH − c > 0 ⇐⇒ γ >
c (2qH − qL)− 2qHΘ (qH − qL)
(3qH − qL) (qH − qL) ≡ γ
E,
p∗EH − p∗EL =
(qL − 2qH) (ΘqL −ΘqH − c) + γ (qL − 5qH) (qL − qH)
(4qH − qL) > 0.
31The environmental concern may also decline over time. As Kahn and Kotchen (2011) point out,
in the last few years the US has experienced substantial erosion in public concern about environmental
issues because of the chilling effect of recession. Based on national surveys, they found a correlation
between unemployment rate and relevance of global warming.
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Next, we insert p∗EL and p
∗E
H into θL and θH to verify that 0 < θ
∗E
L < θ
∗E
H < Θ:
θ∗EL =
qL (c+ ΘqH −ΘqL) + γ (2qH − qL) (qH − qL)
(4qH − qL) qL > 0, always;
θ∗EH − θ∗EL > 0 ⇐⇒ γ < γE; Θ− θH > 0 ⇐⇒ γ > γE.
As usual in these models, 0 < θ∗EL < θ
∗E
H < Θ also guarantees that both firms are active
in the market. Notice that γE > 0 iff Θ <
c (2qH − qL)
2qH (qH − qL) ≡ Θ
E. Therefore, assuming
that Θ > ΘE implies that γE is negative, and then θH < Θ always holds. To sum up, the
conditions that have to be simultaneously satisfied are Θ > ΘE and γ < γE.
Proof of Lemma 2
From (4), γ∗E ≥ 0 iff e ≥ qL (12cqHqL + 8Θq
3
H − 20cq2H − 2cq2L + 3ΘqHq2L − 11Θq2HqL)
2q2H (4qH − qL)
≡
eγE; however, eγE ≥ 0 iff Θ ≤ Θ˜ = 2c(10q
2
H − 6qHqL + q2L)
qH (qH − qL) (8qH − 3qL) , with Θ˜ > Θ
E. It follows
that γ∗E ≥ 0 always for Θ ≥ Θ˜, while in Θ ∈ (ΘE, Θ˜) we have that γ∗E ≥ 0 when e ≥
eγE(> 0). In order to avoid notational complications, we can write that γ∗E ≥ 0 when e ≥
max{0, eγE}. Second, γ∗E < γE iff e < eγE, where
eγE =
qL{(7qH − 2qL) (qH − qL)2 [c−Θ (qH − qL)] + [c+ Θ s (qH − qL)] (4qH − qL) qL}
4q3H (qH − qL)
.
Proof of Lemma 3
We focus on the case in which p∗∗EH > p
∗∗E
L :
p∗∗EH − p∗∗EL > 0 ⇐⇒ t <
2Θq2H − 3ΘqHqL + Θq2L + c (2qH − qL)
qH
≡ t̂.
Moreover, we have to guarantee that at equilibrium prices p∗∗EH and p
∗∗E
L both firms are
active in the market. This implies 0 < θ∗∗EL < θ
∗∗E
H < Θ:
θ∗∗EL =
[cqL + 2tqH + qLΘ (qH − qL)]
qL (4qH − qL) > 0,
θ∗∗EL − θ∗∗EH =
[cqL − t (2qH − qL) + ΘqHqL −Θq2L]qH
(qH − qL) (4qH − qL) qL < 0
⇐⇒ t < qL [c+ Θ(qH − qL)]
(2qH − qL) ≡ t
E
< t̂,
θ∗∗EH −Θ =
c(2qH − qL)− tqH − 2ΘqH(qH − qL)
(qH − qL) (4qH − qL) < 0
⇐⇒ t > c(2qH − qL)− 2ΘqH(qH − qL)
qH
≡ tE.
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By construction, the above conditions also guarantee that p∗∗EH > c and p
∗∗E
L > t. More-
over, tE < 0 iff Θ > ΘE. Hence, both firms are active iff t < t
E
and Θ > ΘE.
Proof of Lemma 4
From (6), we easily obtain that t∗E ≥ 0 iff e ≥ etE = qL[2c (2qH − qL)−ΘqL(qH − qL)]
(4qH − qL) (2qH − qL) .
However, etE ≥ 0 iff Θ ≤ 2c (2qH − qL)
qL (qH − qL) ≡ Θ̂. In order to avoid unnecessary notational
complications, we write: t∗E ≥ 0 when e ≥ max{0, etE}. Secondly, notice that t∗E < tE
iff e < etE =
c (2qH − qL) + 2Θ (qH − qL)2
(2qH − qL) , with e
tE > etE, as expected.
Proof of Proposition 1
This proof can be found in Section 1 of the online Supplementary Material, together
with the social welfare expressions that depend on the policy instrument adopted by the
policymaker (see Remarks 1 and 2).
Proof of Lemma 5
To start with, notice that
p∗HH − p∗HL > 0 ⇐⇒ γ <
Θ (2qH − qL) (qH − qL)− cqH
(5qH − qL) (qH − qL) .
This threshold value of γ decreases in c and increases in Θ. On the one hand, the higher
c is, the more stringent the constraint because pL becomes increasingly higher than pH .
On the other hand, the higher parameter Θ is, the less binding the constraint because
consumers become increasingly heterogeneous and competition softens.32
We have to check whether at the equilibrium prices p∗HL and p
∗H
H both firms are in the
market, i.e. we need to verify that 0 < θ∗HL < θ
∗H
H < Θ:
θ∗HL =
2cqH + (qH − qL) [ΘqL − γ(2qH + qL)]
(4qH − qL) qL > 0 ⇐⇒ γ <
2cqH + Θ (qH − qL) qL
(qH − qL) (2qH − qL) ,
θ∗HH − θ∗HL =
qH [c (qL − 2qH) + (qH − qL) (ΘqL + 2γqH)]
(qH − qL) (4qH − qL) qL > 0 always when Θ > Θ
H ,
θ∗HH −Θ =
(qL − qH) [2ΘqH − γ(3qH − qL)]− cqH
(qH − qL) (4qH − qL) < 0 always when p
∗H
H − p∗HL > 0.
32If γ is high relative to Θ or Θ is low relative to γ, then the high quality good goes off the market:
even the highest quality oriented consumer (which is Θ) will buy the low quality green good. The same
hold when Θ is low relative to γ. Indeed, the higher the Θ, the more heterogeneous are consumers and
so the more difficult it is that the market is served by only one quality.
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By construction, the above conditions also verify that p∗HH > 0 and p
∗H
L > c. Assuming
Θ > ΘH (see (7)), we need to compare only the two threshold values of γ appearing above.
However, given that similar qualitative results will appear when using each of the two
values, we can write γH = min
{
Θ (2qH − qL) (qH − qL)− cqH
(5qH − qL) (qH − qL) ,
2cqH + Θ (qH − qL) qL
(qL − 2qH) (qL − qH)
}
.
Proof of Lemma 6
From (8), γ∗H ≥ 0 iff e ≥ eγH = qH [qLΘ (8qH − 3qL) (qH − qL) + c (3qH − qL) (4qH + qL)]
qL (4qH − qL) (3qH − qL) .
If γH =
Θ (2qH − qL) (qH − qL)− cqH
(5qH − qL) (qH − qL) , γ
∗H < γH ⇐⇒ e < eγH , where:
eγH =
1
qL (3qH − qL) (qH − qL) (5qH − qL) ×
[(qH − qL) (18cq3H − 6Θq4H + 2Θq4L − 8ΘqHq3L + 8Θq3HqL − 3cqHq2L + 5cq2HqL + 4Θq2Hq2L)
+sqL (4qH − qL) (2Θq2H − 3ΘqHqL − cqH + Θq2L)].
If γH =
2cqH + Θ (qH − qL) qL
(qL − 2qH) (qL − qH) , γ
∗H < γH ⇐⇒ e < eγH′ , where:
eγH
′
=
1
(qH − qL) (2qH − qL) (3qH − qL) ×
[(qH − qL) (13cq2H −Θq3H − 3cqHqL + 2Θq3L − 10ΘqHq2L + 9Θq2HqL)
+s (4qH − qL) (Θq2L −ΘqHqL − 2cqH)].
Proof of Lemma 7
We focus on the case in which:
p∗∗HH − p∗∗HL > 0 ⇐⇒ t >
cqH
2qH − qL −Θ(qH − qL) ≡ t˜.
Moreover, we have to guarantee that at these equilibrium prices both firms are active in
the market, i.e. 0 < θ∗∗HL < θ
∗∗H
H < Θ:
θ∗∗HL =
qLΘ (qH − qL) + tqL + 2cqH
(4qH − qL) qL > 0, always;
θ∗∗HH − θ∗∗HL > 0 ⇐⇒ t >
c (2qH − qL)−ΘqL(qH − qL)
qL
≡ tH ;
θ∗∗HH −Θ < 0 ⇐⇒ t <
qH [2Θ (qH − qL) + c]
(2qH − qL) ≡ t
H
.
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This also verifies that p∗∗HH > t and p
∗∗H
L > c, as it can be easily ascertained. In addition,
tH > t˜ holds, and then pH > pL when θH > θL. Moreover, t
H < 0 iffΘ > ΘH . Hence, it
is convenient to assume again that Θ > ΘH in order to eliminate the condition t > tH .
This reduces the number of cases to be examined, without losing economic intuition. By
combining the previous conditions, it follows that conditions Θ > ΘH and t < t
H
are
required to have both players active in an uncovered market.
Proof of Lemma 8
From (10), t∗H > 0 iff e > etH = qH [Θ (4qH − 3qL) (qH − qL) + 2c (2qH − qL)]
(4qH − qL) (2qH − qL) , while
t∗H < tH iff e < etH =
qH [Θ (4qH − 3qL) (qH − qL) + c (3qH − 2qL)]
(2qH − qL)2
.
Proof of Proposition 2
This proof can be found in Section 1 of the online Supplementary Material, together
with the social welfare expressions that depend on the policy instrument adopted by the
policymaker (see Remarks 3 and 4).
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